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Summary:
This paper expreses concern about public administrators' apparent pre-
occupation with productivity. The fact that government has responded
to the recent "tax revolt" by proposing new measures to increase
efficiency, rather than improve effectiveness, is used as an illustra-
tion of this tendancy. The relationship between efficiency and
effectiveness proposed by traditional economic models is criticized,
and a new model based on a political perspective is advocated. Possible
organizational dynamics which might be fueling this preoccupation with
productivity in our public institutions are discussed. In addition,
the potential dysfunctional consequences of administrators attending to
the pressures, to increase efficiency, while overlooking warnings to
improve effectiveness are addressed.
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"My major objective for the new year is to improve
the efficiency of providing public services to our
community." A City Manager
"The cost of doing business with the government is
beyond what the taxpayers are willing to consider."
A Senator
"Proposition 13 clearly shows that the public thinks
government has become too big and too expensive."
A Newspaper Editor
The language of efficiency, productivity, balanced budgets, and
zero growth is pervasive in the public and professional media. We
are supposedly in the throes of a taxpayers' "revolt" against the
burden of high governmental expenses and public officials at all
levels have responded by waving the white flag of increased produc-
tivity.
For the most part, taxpayers' knowledge of, and interest in, the
inner workings of government are not adequate for them to make specific
and concrete recommendations about how government should be improved.
Their message is much more simple and direct, "The cost of doing
business with your organization is outrageously high and if we had
less exorbitant alternatives we would take our business elsewhere."
One way of interpreting this message is that government should in-
crease the efficiency of its operations to reduce costs (taxes). This
is the predominant contemporary response of officials at all levels
of government. However, an alternative interpretation of this nega-
tive feedback from government's clients (and benefactors) is that
the institution of government in our country as it is presently con-
stituted has some fundamental structural and functional flaws.
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This perspective questions the effectiveness of government, not just
its efficiency. It suggests we look beyond the ledger sheet of pub-
lic agencies and examine their ideologies, goals, policies, outputs,
and design. Government's reaction to the referendums of 1978 poses
two troubling questions: First, "Why have governmental officials in-
terpreted this negative feedback exclusively as a problem of inef-
ficiency?" Second, "What are the potential dangers for a public
organization which becomes so preoccupied with matters of efficiency
that it fails to recognize evidence of ineffectiveness?" Possible
answers to each question will be considered in turn.
Productivity as a Panacea
A recent review of 15 years of Public Administration Review articles
on the topic of administration in the public sector showed that the
dominant recommendation for improving administrative practices was
to increase efficiency. Seldom does one find suggestions for enhan-
cing the effectiveness of government by improving the quality of its
outputs, adapting to changing social and political conditions, or ques-
tioning the objectives being pursued by our public institutions. The
closest one comes to finding these themes addressed regularly is in
the periodic proposals for massive reorganization of the federal govern-
ment. But as Mansfield points out, most of these plans have been poli-
tically motivated and have been marketed under the label of increased
efficiency.
Most of the articles on public productivity treat efficiency as
a means for obtaining the end of effectiveness. This formulation grows
out of econometric positivistic reasoning that treats efficiency as an
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independent variable in a regression equation predicting the dependent
variable of effectiveness. In other words, efficiency is treated as a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for obtaining effectiveness.
One reason why this perspective has dominated the literature
of public administration is that it is buttressed by a strong feeling
that it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of government because
its goals are too amorphous. The ultimate objective of a democratic
form of government is to be responsive to the vocalized needs of its
constituencies. However, since these constituencies generally express
conflicting expectations for government, it is difficult for public
officials to compress these multiple, and often contradictory, expecta-
tions into a single comprehensive package of organizational goals for
which they can obtain universal agreement. Consequently, it is natural
for public officials to rely on less controversial and better under-
stood measures of efficiency as the leading indicators of organizational
performance. This choice is based on the logic that since it appears
too difficult to directly measure government's effectiveness, at least
we should develop good measures of its efficiency inasmuch as our eco-
nometric model indicates that increases in governmental efficiency will
aid us in reaching the illusive goal of increased effectiveness.
Our concern with this line of reasoning is that while efficiency
appears in the model as an intermediate step in reaching effectiveness,
in practice it is often treated as if it were a substitute for effec-
tiveness. The problem with concentrating an inordinate amount of
attention on improving efficiency is that its instrumental role is
easily forgotten. The old means becomes the new end and the old end
is treated only as a slogan of the ideal.
-4-
If there is a tendency for this form of goal displacement to
occur in public administration, it is important to understand its
causal roots. These can be found in some very stable and durable
organizational dynamics which are common to most public agencies.
We will discuss four of the dynamics which we feel have lead to the
current preoccupation with measuring and improving the efficiency
of government. The first dynamic is reflected in the axiom: "Num-
bers collected will somehow, sometime, be used as measures of per-
formance." One of the earliest examples of this phenomenon appeared
in Blau's study of employment service offices in the 1940's. He
showed that when this organization decided to have staff members ac-
count for their number of placements, rather than the number of in-
terviews they conducted, supervisors started using this information
in performance appraisals, and as a result interviewers became ex-
tremely competitive and began hording the job openings which could
be most readily filled. The criterion for referring to job inter-
views became the likelihood of placement rather than an optimal match
2between candidate characteristics and job requirements.
It has been frequently noted that public organizations have a pro-
pensity for collecting voluminous files of information about their
internal operations. This practice reflects the need of administra-
tors to appear conscientiously concerned, generally in a legislative
hearing, about how they are expending public trust funds. It also
demonstrates the efforts during this century to make public admini-
stration more bureaucratic and less political. The result of these
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endemic organizational pressures to objectify administration by col-
lecting statistics is that the abundance of quantitative reports in
public agencies often obscures the alternative of using more quali-
tative assessments of performance. As long as numbers are treated
as the only credible evidence of administrative competence, public
administrators will continue to require that their subordinates spend
inordinate amounts of time filling out form after form quantifying
their activities.
The second organizational dynamic, which reinforces the extensive
use of efficiency as a measure of performance, is that the scale of pro-
duction is a highr.y visible aspect of public service programs and hence
it draws the attention of clients and administrators alike. The adver-
tising industry recognizes that when customers lack information about
a product's primary characteristics (e.g., how well a soap gets out
grease) they will judge it on the basis of its secondary characteristics
(e.g., the attractiveness of its package). As we have noted, the av-
erage citizen in America treats government as though it were a magical
black box. A taxpajer f. eds his taxes into a slot, and services
magically emerge from the bottom. Being generally ignorant about the
transformation process inside, the public expresses its dissatisfaction
with this process by questioning the shape, location, or size, of the
box. Because of its visibility, size is frequently expressed as a
cause of poor performance in government. This is manifested in com-
ments like: "The public works department has grown three times its
size in the past 10 years with only a 20% increase in population."
"The number of teachers the school board says are required to educate
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klds today is twice as large as when I went to school and the kids
are not learning their math any better." "Our school district has
only half as many remedial education teachers as another district."
These criticisms tend to focus the attention of public officials on
the form , rather than the substance , of government. Concern for moni-
toring the size and structure of government replaces concern for eval-
uating the process of governing. In education, the humane relationship
between teachers and pupils becomes subordinate to the statistical
relationship between size of studentbody and number of teachers. As
a result, a measure of the efficiency of education is substituted
for a measure of its effectiveness.
Administrators have additional interests in measures of organiza-
tional size. A frequently used estimation of an administrator's status
is the scale of the operations under his/her responsibility. Individual
administrators generally have a desire to expand their power and influ-
ence to include larger and larger spheres of activities as a means of
increasing their sense of prestige and accomplishment. Similarly,
organizations have generally regarded the expansion of an administra-
tor's realm of responsibility as a promotion of sorts, representing
the organization's faith and confidence in the administrator's ability
to manage. Because an increase in the scope of personal responsibility
is a highly valued reward sought after by administrators there is a
natural tendency for them to focus attention on indicators of or-
ganizational scale. As a consequence, indicators of sagging organi-
zational performance may go unnoticed.
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The third dynamic reinforcing a preoccupation with efficiency
is that senior administrators with vested interests in the status
quo are less threatened by proposals to improve efficiency than they
are by proposals to increase effectiveness. Directors of local man-
power service agencies often argue over who has responsibility for
servicing multiple problem clients, the wording of an inter-agency
coordination agreement, or the procedures for determining which agencies
receive credit for successfully placing a client helped by several
programs. However, there is rarely disagreement between these agen-
cies on more substantial issues, such as, the legitimacy of their
client treatment ideology, or the structure of the overall service
3delivery system. Hence, public criticisms of the manpower de-
livery system have generally been treated by its administrators as
problems resulting from poor coordination between existing agencies.
Contemporary government plans for improving the delivery of manpower
services contain proposals for more coordination councils, integrated
legislation to reduce opportunities for fraud by clients who are able
to obtain identical services from multiple agencies, and formalized
interagency referral procedures to widen, and smooth-out, client re-
ferral channels.
Since proposals for increased coordination in an interagency
3ervice delivery system are analogous to proposals for increased ef-
ficiency in a single organization, it is evident that manpower ad-
ninistrators prefer to work on tha problem of inefficiency rather
:han the problem of ineffectiveness. Proposals which question the
iverall ability of the current system to adequately meet the needs
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of the disadvantaged include suggestions which, if adopted, would
substantially discount the value of the training and experience of
current program administrators. For instance, if the private sector
philosophy of competition were adopted and programs with radically
new ideologies and technologies were introduced as competitors to
existing agencies, current administrators would be ill-prepared to
formulate successful strategies for responding to competition. It
is hard to translate expertise in solving problems of inefficiency
into strategies for controlling a turbulent environment.
The fourth efficiency reinforcing dynamic is the traditional divi-
sion of responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches
of our government. The role of the legislative branch is to translate
the will of the people into governmental priorities, goals, and broad
policies, and the role of the executive branch is to implement these
policies by designing and administering governmental programs. It would
appear that this time-honored division of labor has been interpreted
as carrying with it an implicit division of responsibility for addres-
sing the issues of efficiency and effectiveness in government. For
instance, when the director of a public agency is asked to report
on the performance of his/her agency to a legislative committee, the
discussion focuses primarily on the volume of outputs and size of
budget—aspects of efficiency. Seldom is the administrator asked
to comment on the legitimacy of government pursuing the objective
embodied in his/her agency's programs. Legitimacy is assumed to
be a matter of faith. Therefore, to the extent that public admini-
strators believe that debates about the goals and priorities of govern-
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ment should properly fall within the domain of politicians, it may
be inappropriate to search for articles on the effectiveness of gov-
ernment in the public administration literature.
To this point we have attempted to understand why there is a pro-
pensity for public administrators to rely primarily on the ruler of
efficiency in measuring the success of their administrative endeavors.
We have suggested that there are several dynamics inherent within the
process of administering public organizations which act to reinforce
this orientation, but have left unaddressed the matter of consequence.
We will now consider the second part of our opening query about the
taxpayers* revolt, namely, what are the potential dysfunctional con-
sequences of utilizing efficiency as the principal criterion for mea-
suring the performance of an organization? In other words, what are
the costs of using a placebo?
Productivity as a Placebo
To adequately address this issue we first need to reconceptualize
the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness based on a poli-
tical, rather than an economic, model. The political economy model
proposed by Wamsley and Zald provides an appropriate theoretical back-
4drop for re-thinking this relationship. This model treats organi-
zations as clusters of resources nested in an environment of political
and economic interests which are vying for control over these resources.
Relevant interest groups might include suppliers, consumers, regulators,
and internal organizational coalitions (e.g., staff vs. administrators).
It is important to add organizational coalitions to the list of envi-
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ronmental groups to emphasis the fact that an organization's staff
is not an undifferentiated whole working harmoniously together with
a singleness of purpose.
This model of conflicting interests suggests that organizational
goals can be viewed as reflections, and legitimations, of interest group
demands. Several years ago Yuchtman and Seashore criticized the use of
goal accomplishment as a measure of organizational effectiveness because
goals are frequently only rationalized statements about environmental
conditions. The need to appear self-directed leads administrators
to transform environmental constraints into statements of desired ob-
jectives.
Within a political economy perspective, efficiency and effective-
ness are not treated as means and end. Instead, they are both viewed
as end states preferred by vying interest groups. For instance, produc-
tivity in public agencies is generally emphasized by legislators, central
program administrators, auditors, and taxpayers. This interest is
countered by client and professional groups* emphasis on being respon-
sive to changes in the environment, and producing high quality services.
The intensity of the competition between goals espoused by rival
interest groups was documented in a recent study of the role conflict
experienced by directors of manpower agencies. In this study sal-
ient interest groups were asked to rate the effectiveness of each local
agency. When the ratings of effectiveness made by the directors,
staff members, regional program administrators, and community leaders
were compared, they were all negatively correlated. This suggests
that each interest group was using different criteria for measuring
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organizational effectiveness based on their divergent expectations
of how organizational resources should be utilized. Indeed, it vas
shown that the professional staff's criteria for judging organizational
effectiveness was the quality of services provided, the extent to which
professionals' opinions were sought by administrators, and the op-
portunities provided by the agency for professional development. On
the other hand, the central administrators preferred a highly struc-
tured organization that produced a high volumn of client outputs, while
the local community leaders emphasized the importance of agency staff
members participating in activities which had a high degree of com-
munity visibility.
These results support the proposition that efficiency and effec-
tiveness are often competing objectives which are preferred by dif-
ferent interest groups. They further point out that the pursuit of
efficiency in many cases serves as a means for not achieving the end
of effectiveness. In other words, efficiency and effectiveness are
basically antithetical to one another. This is an important point
to date the principal debate in the literature on productivity has
been between those who argue that the concept of public productivity
should include both efficiency and effectiveness, and those who coun-
ter that since productivity has historically been used in the pri-
vate sector as a synonym for efficiency, changing the meaning for gov-
ernment applications would prove confusing. Our concern is that
neither approach acknowledges that the complex relationship between
efficiency and effectiveness cannot be fully represented using a simple
additive model. The. danger of not drawing attention to the contradictory
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nature of this relationship is that it nay lead many to the erroneous
conclusion that the primary role of public administration is to simply
solve the problem of increasing agency outputs per budget dollar. I
say "simply" not to suggest that the technical solution to this problem
is simple, but to raise an objection to the fact that it is being
treated as a problem reduceable to applying technical solutions. Lit-
tle attention is given to the fact that the best technical solution
Q
is often not a viable alternative because it is politically infeasible.
This suggests that administrators should be characterized as di-
lemma managers, rather than as problem solvers. In that vein, one of
their most challenging dilemmas arises from the need to enhance short-
term stability (efficiency) while maintaining long-term adaptability
(effectiveness). Stability is enhanced by increasing the efficiency
of resource utilization, reducing diversity of internal interest groups
to decrease conflict over objectives and preferred outcomes, increas-
ing coordination, reducing redundancy, and attempting to standardize
and formalize all work activities. The liability of administrators
over-emphasizing this aspect of their management role is that every
new effort to standardize organizational activities costs the organi-
zation a "degree of freedom" in its potential for adapting to changing
environmental conditions.
For decades our governmental institution (especially the federal
level) has operated as if it assumed that the environment should adapt
to the needs of public agencies, rather than vice-versa. However,
contemporary American organizations, citizen groups, and foreign coun-
tries are increasingly showing intolerance for this air of arrogance.
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After Watergate, the CIA and FBI hearings, the Pentagon Papers, Propo-
sition 13, the Indian sit-ins in the Bureau of Indian Affairs offices,
indictments of Senators for graft in public office, and the anti-abor-
tion, consumerism, and tax reduction movements, one must conclude that
what was once perceived as a benign and placid environment has become
increasingly turbulent, unpredictable, and reactive. This being the
case it behouves public administrators to focus more attention on
assessing the adaptive potential of their organizations.
An organization's ability to react constructively to a rapidly
changing and uncertain environment is a function of two characteristics
:
internal variety, and structural flexibility. Aahby's Law of Requisite
9Variety posits that it takes variety to destroy variety. In organi-
zational terminology this means that an organization should contain
a staff whose professional backgrounds, training, and task assignments,
collectively represent a "pool of variability" which is equal to the
variety in the environmental information being monitored. Otherwise,
in a turbulent and heterogeneous environment potentially critical in-
formation will not be noticed, or decipherable, or the appropriate
suggestion for formulating an adaptive response will not be forthcoming
from the staff.
Pearl Harbor is a tragic example of a poor adaptive response due
to insufficient internal variety. Admiral Kimmel's command post in
Hawaii had received repeated intelligence reports warning of a possible
attack on Pearl Harbor but consistently discounted the possibility be-
cause all members of the group shared an Illusion of invulnerability.
Similarly, President Johnson's ingroup, the "Tuesday Cabinet," kept
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escalating the Vietnam war despite repeated setbacks and defeats. This
was done because group members shared a belief that if the United States
demonstrated a significant enough commitment to win the war, North
Vietnam would back down from a confrontation with a superpower. In
both cases warning; signals from the environment were discounted be-
cause all members of the organization interpreted them in the same
manner. With a larger pool of variability in these analysis groups
these classic blunders in foreign policy may have been averted.
Adaptability is also enhanced by a flexible organizational structure.
An organization might have a staff which represents a high degree of
variety, in terms of their values, background, and expertise, but nul-
lify this adaptive potential by forcing members to interact with one
another according to highly standardized and formalized procedures. The
"cookie cutter" approach to designing organizations and tasks tends to
be maladaptive in turbulent environments because it acts as a damper on
the creative potential of members. Structural flexibility can be en-
hanced in a number of ways. These include: 1. Discrediting the
natural tendency to rely heavily on precedents and standard operating
procedures. ?.. Reducing the requirements for tight coordination
between task units and hierarchical levels, so as to achieve a state
of "loose-coupling" wherein semi-autonomous units are encouraged to
adapt to localized environmental conditions. ' 3. Building redun-
dancy into the organizational structure as a means of stimulating com-
12petition and debates, and reducing the probability of systemic failure.
4. Simulating environmental crises (administrative fire drills) to
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determine whether the organization's structure facilitates rapid and
creative responses. 5. Utilizing consultants (e.g., retired "sages")
to spot bottlenecks in the administrative apparatus.
Clearly, there are constraints on public organizations which place
a ceiling on their maximum feasible adaptive potential. Wlldavsky's essay
on the unlikelihood of designing a truly responsive public agency points
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out this fact extremely well. But to argue that it is impossible
for public administrators to become totally responsive to their environ-
ment misses the point. Our concern is that the contemporary treatment
of public productivity obscures the fact that administrators have
dual responsibilities for improving both stability (efficiency) and
adaptability (effectiveness). When administrators become preoccupied
with improving internal efficiency they tend to view their environment
through the wrong end of the telescope. This has the effect of making
potential crises appear very small and very distant.
Irving Janis' book Victims of Group Think has drawn attention to
14thxs tendency in government. Janis noted that many of the notorious
failures of the United States to react appropriately to pending crises
in international affairs (e.g., Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Korean, wars)
stemmed from the tendency of the group of policy analysts and adminis-
trators addressing these issues to rationalize away warning signals,
misinterpret information, and adopt group norms which discouraged dis-
agreement and debate over alternatives. The group viewed itself as
inherently moral and invulnerable to serious blunder, and yielded to
strong internal pressures to preserve feelings of loyalty and unanimity.
Hopefully, the past mistakes of officials responsible for national
defense can serve as lessons for officials administering domestic
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programs so that their insensitivity to changing environmental con-
ditions does not become a national offense.
Conclusion
The reaction of government to the recent tax revolt has been used
to highlight the fact that public administration is dominated by an
efficiency orientation grounded in an econometric model of effective-
ness. Clearly, the nature of the production process affects the type,
and quality, of outputs. However, the failure to recognize that ef-
ficiency and effectiveness should also be viewed as basically anti-
thetical systemic goals obscures the need for administrators to bal-
ance their emphasis on stability and adaptability. A system preoccupied
with increasing productivity is ill-prepared to adapt to changing en-
vironmental conditions.
The central argument of this paper has been that the lack of
attention to issues of organizational effectiveness in public ad-
ministration is not due to a lack of expressed concern for their im-
portance. Instead, our view is that insufficient day-to-day attention
is being focused on improving effectiveness because it is overshadowed
by a preoccupation with increasing efficiency. We have tried to high-
light some of the organizational dynamics fueling the tendency to treat
productivity as if it were a panacea for public organizations, and dis-
cussed some of the possible dysfunctional consequences of attributing
to productivity (like a placebo) exaggerated curative powers.
Finally, much work remains to be done before the field will
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possess a full understanding of why the folly of pursuing A (efficiency),
while hoping for B (effectiveness), is so pervasive in our public
institutions. In the meantime, it is hoped that this discussion of
the antithetical nature of the relationship between efficiency and
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